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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
BECAUSE THE LABOR COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
PROVISIONS FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY SET OUT IN U.C.A. §
34A-2-413(6), AND APPELLEES FAILED TO SHOW ANY STIPULATION
WITH RESPECT TO A FINAL ORDER OR SECOND-STEP PROCEEDING,
THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND MUST
REMAND THIS CASE TO THE LABOR COMMISSION FOR PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH § 413(6)
Appellees have challenged Appellants' assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the instant appeal. Specifically, the Appellee, Johnny Albert (hereinafter "Albert"), argued in
his Appellee's brief that "whether styling its argument as 'jurisdictional' relieved Ameritemps of
its duty to exhaust its administrative remedies is a pre-requisite to asking this Court for relief"
(Johnny Albert's Appellee's Brief, page v). Moreover, Albert argued in his Appellee's brief that
"Ameritemps waived its right to rehabilitate Mr. Albert when it stipulated that Mr. Albert was
permanently totally disabled." {Id. at page 1).
Albert further argued in his Appellee's Brief that Appellants stipulated to permanent total
disability and, therefore, the Labor Commission's order was final and Appellants' argument that
this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this appeal is moot.

Albert and Appellee Labor

Commission (hereinafter referred to as "Labor Commission"), both argued that this Court has the
jurisdiction to hear this appeal and that Appellants merely style our argument for dismissal as
jurisdictional.

Albert's and the Labor Commission's arguments are without merit as the

permanent total disability statute specifically defines final orders in the context of permanent
and total disability.
Specifically, Albert argues that Appellants stipulated to overall permanent total disability
compensation and relinquished Appellants' rights to a rehabilitation plan or second-step
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proceeding. This is not the case as permanent total disability is defined within overall permanent
total disability compensation in Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67(1 )(b)(ii), this section being the
enforceable section on the date of Albert's industrial injury.

Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-

67(l)(b)(ii) provides that entitlement to permanent total disability compensation rests on the
establishment of an employee's showing of permanent total disability along with two other
elements.

The statute further provides that entitlement to permanent total disability

compensation rests on the Labor Commission's finding that an employee is pemianently and
totally disabled, which provides for a four factor test, which includes the following:
(i)

the employee is not gainfully employed;

(ii)

the employee has an impairment or combination of
impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic
work activities;

(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or
combination of impairments prevent the employee from
performing the essential functions of the work activities for
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably
available, taking into consideration the employee's age,
education, past work experience, medical capacity and
residual functional capacity. (Utah Code Ann. §35-167(l)(c)(i)-(iv)).
Accordingly, as can be seen from the statute in place at the time of the injury, overall
permanent total disability compensation rests on the employee proving that he is permanently
and totally disabled, which involves the four-factor tests stated above.

Once the employee

proves he is permanently and totally disabled, the employee still must prove that:
(i)

the employee sustained a significant impairment or
combination of impairment as a result of the industrial
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accident or occupational disease that gives right to the
permanent total disability entitlement;. . .
(iii)

the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct
cause of the employee's permanent total disability.

Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-67(l)(b)(i) and (iii).
Albert and the Labor Commission appear to argue that Appellants stipulated to Albert's
permanent and total disability compensation and, therefore, the Labor Commission's order was a
final order and jurisdiction was vested in this Court to hear the instant appeal. Appellants
dispute the fact that they agreed to overall permanent total disability compensation. The Labor
Commission's direct question to Appellants was as follows:
The Court:

Let me ask you this, Mr. Kanell: Do you agree that
Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled or
just disputing the cause of that, in addition to the . . .

Mr. Kanell:

Well, you know, it's hard to say, Your Honor. I
don't have any proof to the contrary. I'm not here
to submit proof on that issue.
I would only say that this guy is a guy who's had a
dozen industrial accidents and has been on
industrial compensation pretty much most of his
work life.

The Court:

Mr. Morris. (R835 at 17).

Even if the above-referenced language could be construed as an admission that
permanent total disability existed, as defined by Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-67(l)(c)(i)-(iv), it
does not follow that Appellants waive their second step proceeding or right to a rehabilitation
plan.
In fact, Utah Code Annotated § 35-l-67(6)(a) provides that: "[a] finding by the
Commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties."
As seen from the plain language of the statutory text, above, even if a party agrees that an
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employee is permanently and totally disabled with respect to the specific definition of permanent
total disability under Subsequent (c), the parties would also have to stipulate that the permanent
and total disability was a final order, which is not the case in the instant matter. Nowhere in the
pleadings or proceedings in the instant case was there a stipulation that the alleged permanent
and total disability of Albert was a final order of permanent total disability.
In fact, the Labor Commission failed to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 35-167(6)(a)(iii), which provides in pertinent part that: "[t]he Commission, after notice to the parties,
holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to
review any re-employment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under
Subsection (6)(a)(ii)." Albert and the Labor Commission argue that Appellants did not dispute
and stipulated to the fact that Albert was permanently and totally disabled. They argue the
Commission need only have determined if Albert had sustained significant impairments as a
result of an industrial accident or accidents and to determine whether the industrial accident was
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Nowhere can Albert or the Labor Commission
point to a stipulation that Appellants stipulated that the Commission's finding of permanent total
disability was a final order, which is necessary under Subsection (6)(a).
Accordingly, Albert and the Labor Commission have failed to show, and cannot show,
that Appellants stipulated or agreed that the Commission's finding of permanent total disability
was a final order as provided by Subsection (6)(a). This being the case, the Labor Commission
erred by entering a final order of permanent total disability given the fact the Commission did
not comply with Subsection (6)(a)(i)-(iii). After finding Albert was permanently totally disabled
as a result of a significant impairment or combination of impairments as the result of an
industrial accident, and the industrial accident was the direct cause of his permanent total
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disability, the Labor Commission should have completed the next step in a permanent total
disability case by requesting a rehabilitation plan, reviewing a summary of re-employment
activities, and holding a hearing regarding the rehabilitation or re-employment.

The Labor

Commission's failure to do so divested any jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals as the
Labor Commission failed to comply with its own statutory requirement for a finding of a final
order of permanent and total disability.
Appellants argue, therefore, that no final order has been issued by the Labor Commission
as it failed to jcomply with Subsection (6)(a). Consequently, the Court of Appeals lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of this appeal and should remand this case to the Labor
Commission for further litigation on the permanent and total disability issue. As stated in
Appellants' Brief, this is a threshold issue that may be raised at any time on appeal.
In support of Appellants' argument that the Utah Court of Appeals lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, Appellants point to a recent Utah Court of Appeals case wherein the Utah Court of
Appeals remanded a case due to the fact the Labor Commission had not entered a final order of
permanent total disability and, therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. (Target Trucking v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, 108 P.3d 128). In
Target Trucking, the Administrative Law Judge entered a preliminary determination the
employee qualified for permanent total disability and asked for a rehabilitation or re-employment
plan for the employee, which did not occur in the instant case. (Id. at para. 1). Instead of filing a
rehabilitation plan, the employer filed a motion for review with the Labor Commission. The
Commission overturned the ALJ's final award of permanent total disability and submitted the
case back to the ALJ for a re-employment plan or rehabilitation plan. (Id. at para. 2). The
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employer appealed the Labor Commission's remand to the Utah Court of Appeals seeking to
overturn the decision awarding permanent total disability. (Id. at para. 2).
On appeal, the employee in Target argued the petition at the Utah Court of Appeals
should be dismissed because there was not a final agency action in the case. (Id. at para. 3). The
employee argued the ALJ's finding of permanent total disability was an interim order rather than
a final order as the Labor Commission had not completed the requirements of Subsection (6)(a).
{Id.). Subsection (6)(a) provided that a finding of permanent total disability was not final until
the Commission considered a re-employment plan. (Id.).
The Utah Court of Appeals, held that the Utah Supreme Court had implied "that the
initial findings of permanent disability are not final." (Id. at para. 5, citing, Thomas v. Color
Country MgmU 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201). Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals held that
"an interim order of permanent total disability is not final and appealable until the requirements
of [Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-67(6)] are met." (Id. at para. 6). The result of this finding was
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and awaited an appeal from a
final agency order. (Id.).
As recently stated by the Court of Appeals in Target, when the Labor Commission has
not complied with Subsection (6), the agency order is not a final order and, therefore, the Court
of Appeals would not have jurisdiction over this matter until the Labor Commission entered a
final order pursuant to the statute. Again, Albert and the Labor Commission cannot point to any
stipulation or agreement wherein the Appellants stipulated that the Labor Commission order was
a final order and nowhere can Albert or the Labor Commission point to a stipulation wherein the
Appellants agreed that no rehabilitation was necessary. Accordingly, as no stipulation for a final
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order of permanent total disability exists, and the Labor Commission has yet to comply with
Subsection (6), no final order was entered in the matter below and, therefore, this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal and should remand the case for a final
agency order after all necessary steps have been taken.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE LABOR COMMISSION MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE
FACTS IN THIS CASE IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT ALBERT'S JUNE 16,
1997, INDUSTRIAL INJURY WAS THE DIRECT CAUSE OF HIS PERMANENT
AND TOTAL DISABILITY,
APPELLANTS
HAVE
SHOWN THE
COMMISSION'S
DETERMINATION
WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Both Albert and the Labor Commission have argued in their Appellees' brief that
Appellants have failed to marshal the facts and show there is not substantial evidence for finding
that Petitioner's 1997 toe injury was the direct cause of the Petitioner's permanent and total
disability. Appellants posited in their Appellants' Brief that the Labor Commission did not make
any factual findings with respect to subsequent intervening, non-industrial accidents which
Albert suffered outside of the industrial setting. (Appellants' Brief, page 14). In the Appellants'
Brief, Appellants pointed to extensive additional facts showing that Petitioner suffered
subsequent intervening, non-industrial accidents to his toe and to his back that should have
precluded an award that the Labor Commission made no findings on and substantively failed to
address. In fact, the Labor Commission used the following as the basis for awarding permanent
total disability in the instant case in the Labor Commission's application of the "direct cause of
the Petitioner's permanent total disability":

Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this
case revealed that despite the legion of medical and psychological
impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course of his
life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June
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16, 1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,
1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and 4% whole person
permanent impairment, provided to be the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after
the June 16, 1997 industrial accident, and thereafter by consensus
remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the
preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr.
Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997, acted as the direct
cause of his permanent total disability. (R.515).
Based upon the Labor Commission's opinion above, the Labor Commission found the
Ameritemps industrial injury to be the direct cause of Albert's permanent and total disability
based upon the fact that he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on January 16,
1997. The Court did not make a finding with respect to causation regarding Albert's subsequent
intervening, non-industrial accidents.

The Court, without any indication to the record,

determined that Albert was not able to work after the June 16, 1997, industrial accident with
Ameritemps. This finding is not based on substantial evidence in the record as already pointed
out in Appellants' Brief wherein the Appellants have shown that Albert was released back to
work by his own treating doctor and that his own testimony stated at the time of the hearing that
his worst problem was his back as far as being able to work at the time of the hearing.
(Appellants' Brief, page 19).
The Labor Commission completely disregarded Albert's own testimony regarding the
reason why he was not able to work after his industrial injury with Ameritemps, which is amply
supported by the medical record. Both Albert and the Labor Commission have argued that
Appellants have failed in their burden to marshal the evidence with respect to the substantial
evidence standard and the Labor Commission's determination that the Ameritemps accident was
the direct cause of Albert's permanent total disability. Appellants believe they have met this
burden with respect to the Labor Commission's above-referenced finding as to the direct cause
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of Albert's permanent total disability. Appellants, however, submit the following citations to the
record in response to Albert's and the Labor Commission's Appellees' Brief.
The Labor Commission's findings pertinent to the instant appeal are as follows:
(1)

Mr. Albert was able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16, 1997 with
Ameritemps;

(2)

The fractured great toe on June 16, 1997, proved to be the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back; and

(3)

Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16, 1997 industrial accident.

The following supporting and opposing facts from the whole record on appeal will show
the Labor Commission lacked substantial evidence to make the above-referenced finding as to
the direct cause of Albert's permanent total disability status.
With respect to parapgrah (1), above, and for purposes of this appeal, Appellants do not
dispute that Albert worked up to and including June 16, 1997. Moreover, Appellants agree that
the medical records supports the fact that Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment rating
from his back injuries caused by the June 8, 1990 industrial accident and the January 21, 1991
accident. Appellants do not dispute that Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment rating
from his right foot injuries caused from his July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Appellants do not
dispute that Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment rating from his left foot injury
caused by his June 16, 1997 industrial injury. Moreover, Appellants do not dispute that Albert
suffered a 30% whole person impairment rating from psychological problems, 20%) of which
preexisted his industrial accidents. Accordingly, with respect to (1), Appellants do not dispute
that Albert worked until the injury sustained on June 16, 1997.
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With respect to (2), above, Appellants disputed in the Appellant's Brief the fact that the
fractured great toe on June 16, 1997, proved to be the preverbal straw that broke the camel's
back. (Appellants brief, pages 14-21). As Appellants' previous facts regarding Albert's ability to
return to work and his subsequent intervening, non-industrial accidents have been well
documented in Appellants' Brief, Appellants will refer to the Appellants Brief with respect to the
facts cited therein.
Appellants provide the following marshalling of the evidence with respect to whether
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Labor Commission's determination
that the fractured great toe injury on June 16, 1997 was the straw that broke the camel's back.
The following records support the Labor Commission's determination that the fractured great toe
injury of June 16, 1997 was the direct cause of Albert's permanent and total disability. (R. 98,
99, 122, 123, 123A, 124, 138-141, 178-184, 234, 272-273, 282-296, 311, 312, 313, 357, 360365, 460, 509, 510, 515, 522, 524, 525, 526-527, 580, 583-587, 598A-607, 610, 615, 622-623,
625-627, 642, 643, 645-648, 649, 652, 654, 662-663, 670-672, 676, 685-688, 697-698, 700, 701,
726-736,771,814-819,825).
Appellant's note that R. 835, the hearing transcript, already has been addressed in the
previous records notation. Specifically, the hearing transcript was addressed and introduced into
the record from R.608-R.655.

Accordingly, appellants have already addressed the hearing

transcript and will not reproduce the citations made in the pertinent section, above.

The following medical records are marshaled with respect as to whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Labor Commission's finding that Albert's fractured great toe
on June 16, 1997 proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. (R. 831:17-25,
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26-27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 32-41, 43-61, 62-72, 73-82; R.833: 23-44, 65, 129-132, 188-198, 211-212,
229-235; 834: 10-12, 15-19, 21, 38-39, 49-50, 103-104, 107-109, 111, 113, 114, 119, 128-129,
134, 138-143, 146-167, 320-327, 342-343, 352A-I, 354-358, 364A-366A, 367A, 368-369).
Appellants note that many of the above medical records are duplicates; however, in
having to go through the whole record on appeal, Appellant erred on the side of caution. The
above-referenced information could support the Labor Commission's contention that the
fractured great toe on June 16, 1997 proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's
back. Appellants, however, feel that the information as stated in their Appellants' Brief, starting
on page 14, not only shows that an opposing decision should have been made, but also shows the
industrial injury was not the straw that broke the camel's back. In fact, the Labor Commission
failed to address numerous subsequent intervening, non industrial accident's and numerous
releases to return to work that show Albert was able and cleared to return to work absent his
lower back pain and absent the subsequent intervening, non industrial accidents. (R. 831: 39, 72,
87, 95; 833: 26, 31, 224-227; 834: 18, 23, 48-51, 310-313, 352A-352I).
Based upon the forgoing, Appellants argue that the Labor Commission's decision was
clear error and not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Appellants further argue that
the Labor Commission failed to address the documented subsequent intervening, non-industrial
injury Albert suffered from 1997 to 2002. Accordingly, Appellants respectfully request the
Labor Commission's decision awarding permanent and total disability benefits be overturned as
the Labor Commission misapplied the law to the facts in determining the June 16, 1997
industrial accident was a direct cause of Albert's permanent and total disability.
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With respect to paragraph (3), Appellants argue that there is substantial evidence in the
record that Albert did not return to work after June 16, 1997. Appellant's, however, point to
their citations to the medical record and to the evidentiary record contained in the Appellants'
Brief starting at page 14 and contained in the records addressing paragraph (2), above, to show
that Albert was cleared to return to work numerous times after June 16, 1997. Appellants also
argue that substantial evidence in the records exists to show Albert was cleared for work by
numerous doctors and, therefore, Albert could have returned to work absent his subsequent
intervening, non industrial accidents and could not return to work as a result of his ongoing back
pain of which he already had a permanent partial impairment rating.
Accordingly, Appellants submit that Albert's June 16, 1997, accident did uot prevent
Albert from returning to work in the national or local economy. Instead, Albert's subsequent
intervening, non industrial accident and his low back prevented him from obtaining employment
in the national or local economy. Appellants respectfully request the Utah Court of Appeals
overturn the Labor Commission's ruling that the June 16, 1997 industrial injury was the direct
cause of Albert's permanent total disability as the ruling is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record and is clearly erroneous.
CONCULSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court of Appeals should remand this case to the Labor
Commission as it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal. As subject matter
jurisdiction is a threshold question, it can be raised at any time during the proceedings below or
on appeal. Appellees have failed to show that Appellants have stipulated or agreed to a final
order of permanent total disability or a forfeiture of a rehabilitation plan or second step
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proceeding. Consequently, the Order issued by the Labor Commission is not a final order and,
therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals lacks subject matter jurisdiction as there is no final order in
the instant case.
Furthermore, even if the Utah Court of Appeals determines it is vested with subject
matter jurisdiction over the instant appeal, Appellants submit the Labor Commission misapplied
the law to the facts in making the determination that the June 16, 1997, industrial accident was
the direct cause of Albert's permanent and total disability. Appellants have shown by numerous
citations and a marshalling of the evidence of the entire record that the Labor Commission failed
to take into account the numerous releases to return back to work and the subsequent intervening,
non industrial accidents from 1997-2002. Accordingly, the Labor Commissions determination
that the June 16, 1997, industrial accident was the direct cause of Albert's permanent and total
disability was clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Accordingly, Appellants respectfully request the Utah Court of Appeals remand this case
back to the Labor Commission for a final determination and order in the instant case. In the
alternative, Appellants respectfully request the Court of Appeals overturn the Labor
Commission's ruling of permanent total disability with respect to the June 16, 1997 industrial
accident.
DATED THIS

day of July, 2005.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

z^HEODORE E. KANELL
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA
Attorneys for Appellants
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